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This paper uses a dynamic dominant-￿rm model with an endogenous merger process to examine the
e⁄ects of trade liberalization on industry structure. Domestic and cross-border mergers and demergers are
allowed for. When ￿rms are myopic and the dominant ￿rm has a su¢ ciently high pre-merger capital share
in any one country, trade liberalization causes the industry to become signi￿cantly more concentrated.
When ￿rms are forward-looking, this anti-competitive e⁄ect of trade liberalization is mitigated. Tari⁄
reduction from a prohibitive to a non-prohibitive level aligns merger patterns across countries and initiates
merger (or demerger) waves simultaneously across countries, provided all ￿rms are equally forward-
looking. When the dominant ￿rm is more forward-looking than the fringe, however, this result may
be reversed. These results, thus, highlight the importance of taking into consideration existing industry
structure and ￿rms￿discount rates whilst formulating competition policy in the face of trade liberalization.
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11 Introduction
Successive rounds of international trade negotiations have reduced trade barriers worldwide consistently
over the past few decades, with the average tari⁄level of the GATT and WTO members, as a percentage of
1930 tari⁄ levels, falling from 21.2 subsequent to the Tokyo round (ended 1979) to below 14.8 subsequent
to the start of the Doha round (Bowen, Hollander, and Viaene (1998)). At the same time, free trade
agreements have also proliferated at a more regional level amongst di⁄erent groups of countries. In
Europe, for example, the move towards free trade has been a necessary step towards closer economic
integration. In North America, tari⁄s on most manufactured goods have decreased substantially as a
result of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement signed in 1989 and the North American Free Trade
Agreement signed in 1994. Simultaneously, one of the most signi￿cant ways in which ￿rms have been
bringing about changes in industry structure is through their decisions to participate in mergers. The
total volume of mergers worldwide has been growing at an annual rate of 42% over the period 1980-1999,
according to the UN￿ s World Development Report. Merger activity has steadily grown since, across
industries and countries, to reach unprecedented levels in 2006 with the total value of merger activity
worldwide surpassing $3 trillion.
Within this context, a natural question that arises is the following. Has trade liberalization played
an active role in encouraging mergers? Besides a⁄ecting the number of mergers across the world, is
trade liberalization in￿ uencing the pattern of mergers? In particular, cross-border mergers (as opposed
to domestic ones) have been on the rise, constituting approximately 25-30% of total merger activity,
between 1987 and 1999 (Brakman, Garresten and Marrewijk (2005)).
Existing studies that examine merger activity in open economies consist of two broad categories. The ￿rst
imposes an exogenously given pattern of mergers within the industry (Benchekroun and Ray Chaudhuri
(2006), Gaudet and Kanouni (2004), Long and Vousden (1995)), whilst the second endogenizes the merger
process (Falvey (2005), Horn and Persson (2001b), Yildiz (2003)).1 The main limitation of the ￿rst
category is that these studies are restricted to examining a merger pattern that might not be realized
at equilibrium. This is because by exogenously imposing an arbitrarily chosen merger pattern, these
studies ignore other patterns which might be more pro￿table. An endogenous merger process allows for
all possible potential merger patterns, thus ensuring that the post-merger scenario yielded by the model
represents an industry equilibrium.2 This model, therefore, incorporates an endogenous merger process.
This paper di⁄ers from the existing literature on mergers in an open economy in that a multi-period setting
is considered, where ￿rms are rational and forward-looking. There does exist a literature of dynamic
1It is noted that there exists a related stream of literature which focuses on the interplay between trade and competition
policies (Collie (2003), De Stefano and Rysman (forthcoming), Head and Ries (1995), Horn and Levinsohn (2001), Qiu and
Zhou (2006), Richardson (1999) and Saggi and Yildiz (2006)). These studies focus on the welfare implications of mergers
within an open economy context.
2Alternative frameworks for endogenizing the merger process within a closed economy scenario are provided by Horn and
Persson (2001a), Kamien and Zang (1990, 1993), Qiu and Zhou (2007) and Rodrigues.(2001).
2models which predicts the evolution of industry structure through time, and allows for entry into and exit
from the industry (Ericson and Pakes (1995), Pakes (2000) and Pakes and McGuire (1994)). These models,
however, do not allow for any merger activity. Existing dynamic merger models include Gowrisankaran
(1999), Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004), Judd and Cheong (forthcoming) and Marino and Zabojnik
(2006). These papers have established that forward-looking ￿rms make signi￿cantly di⁄erent merger
decisions than myopic ￿rms. However, they are restricted to closed economy scenarios. Thus, this paper
is a ￿rst to apply a dynamic model with an endogenous merger process to an open economy setting.
A partial equilibrium scenario3 with two countries, Home and Foreign, is considered, where trade lib-
eralization occurs bilaterally. This re￿ ects the tari⁄ cuts that are realized subsequent to rounds of
international trade negotiations.
In reality, ￿rms within an industry are heterogeneous and enjoy di⁄erent degrees of market power. Merger
decisions of individual ￿rms are dependent on the market power of each merger participant relative to
other participants and non-participants. The model in this paper incorporates this heterogeneity at the
￿rm level. For tractability, I follow Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004) and use a dominant-￿rm model,
that is, an industry consisting of a single ￿rm with market power and others with no market power.4
There exists a competitive fringe in each country and a single multi-national dominant ￿rm that begins
each period with given capital shares in each of the two countries.
Within the multi-period framework, each period consists of two stages.5 In the ￿rst stage, the ￿rms
undertake merger decisions, which re-allocate the stock of industry-speci￿c capital amongst the ￿rms. In
this case, a merger (demerger) is said to occur whenever the dominant ￿rm buys (sells) capital from (to)
the fringe ￿rms. The choices of all ￿rms regarding the amount of capital to buy/sell and the location
at which to buy/sell (Foreign or Home) are endogenized. That is, the ￿rms are allowed to choose which
other ￿rms they wish to merge with and how many other ￿rms they wish to merge with. In the second
stage, the ￿rms undertake their investment and output decisions, that is, how much to invest in next
period￿ s capital stock and how much of the consumption good to produce and to sell in each country. In
the consumption goods markets and in the capital goods markets in both countries, the dominant ￿rm
moves ￿rst, followed by the fringe ￿rms.
Two key assumptions are made about the technology. The ￿rst is that all ￿rms have access to an identical
constant returns to scale technology. If there were economies of scale or if the dominant ￿rm had a cost
advantage over the fringe ￿rms, then the dominant ￿rm would have an extra incentive to buy capital.
I abstract away from this well-understood e⁄ect in order to focus on the other factors a⁄ecting merger
decisions as described below. The second assumption is that the capital stock required for production is
3Neary (2003, 2007) studies cross-border mergers in a general equilibrium setting, taking into consideration the e⁄ects
of economy wide shocks such as changes in legal and regulatory environments and asymmetric business cycles on merger
activity. On the other hand, this paper uses a partial equilibrium setting, which focuses on the strategic interaction of ￿rms
within an industry.
4This feature is similar to that used by Schleifer and Vishny (1986) in their model.
5The two-stage framework is similar to Perry and Porter (1985).
3industry-speci￿c. If this were not the case, capital could costlessly ￿ ow in from other industries, in which
case mergers would be rendered futile.
The capital good is assumed to be physically immobile across borders.6 However, the consumption goods
produced in one of the countries need not be sold within the local market. The producer can choose to
export the goods. Resale of the consumption good is not allowed for.
Using the dominant-￿rm framework, it is possible to focus on the key factors a⁄ecting the merger decisions
of heterogeneous ￿rms (di⁄ering in terms of size and behavior) within an industry. First, ￿rms have an
incentive to push the industry towards monopoly, since a monopoly maximizes industry pro￿ts: the
"market power e⁄ect". Second, ￿rms have an incentive to not participate in mergers. By remaining
outside the merger, ￿rms can free ride on the e⁄orts made by the merger participants to increase the
industry price level (Stigler (1950)): the "free-rider e⁄ect". Third, large ￿rms, which internalize the e⁄ects
of their own actions on industry output and price, have di⁄erent incentives to invest in the industry￿ s
capital stock than do small ￿rms: the "size e⁄ect". Apart from these three e⁄ects, which would also exist
in a closed economy model, a fourth factor that a⁄ects merger decisions in the open economy case is that
the dominant ￿rm can a⁄ect the price of capital in both the countries whenever it buys or sells capital
in any one. This is labeled the "cross-border e⁄ect".
The above four factors hold in both a single-period scenario (where ￿rms behave myopically) as well as
in a multi-period model where ￿rms are forward-looking. An additional factor which comes into play
only in the dynamic case is the following. As the ￿rms become more forward-looking, the dominant ￿rm
￿nds it increasingly pro￿table to sell capital in both countries. The key factor driving the di⁄erences
in the results yielded by the single and multi-period cases (both of which are analyzed in this paper) is
the dominant ￿rm￿ s inability to commit to future behavior in the latter case. Subsequent to a merger,
forward-looking fringe ￿rms expect the dominant ￿rm to cut production, thereby raising the price of the
consumption good. Also, a merger raises the price of capital and signals that the dominant ￿rm might
continue to buy capital from the fringe in the future. This encourages the fringe ￿rms to invest at a
higher rate. To discourage the fringe from investing, the dominant ￿rm uses the sale of capital as a signal
to indicate that it will not raise the price of the consumption good or buy capital in the future. This is
labeled the "dynamic e⁄ect".
Having determined the factors a⁄ecting merger decisions at any given tari⁄level, the paper addresses the
main issue of interest: the e⁄ect of trade liberalization on the incentives to merge. The impact of tari⁄
reductions on merger activity is shown to depend on the pre-merger capital shares of the dominant ￿rm
in both countries and on the discount factor. Let us now turn to a discussion of the main results.
First, when discussing the e⁄ects of trade liberalization, it is important to distinguish between whether
6This is applicable to industries where the capital good consists of heavy machinery which is costly to relocate, or where
the capital is location speci￿c. For example, if the capital is knowledge pertaining to a particular country￿ s market (demand
conditions or retail network), it may not be useful in another country.
4the tari⁄reduction in question is from a prohibitive to a non-prohibitive level or from one non-prohibitive
level to another. Given an identical discount factor for all ￿rms and a prohibitive tari⁄ level, there occur
mergers in one country and demergers in the other. However, opening up the economies by reducing the
tari⁄ to a non-prohibitive level generates merger (or demerger) waves simultaneously in both countries,
thereby aligning merger patterns across the countries. This result is driven by the fact that the "cross-
border e⁄ect" is muted when the tari⁄ is prohibitive, but is kicked into motion as the tari⁄ is reduced to
a non-prohibitive level. Five major merger waves have been observed internationally during the period
1900-2000 (Kleinert and Klodt (2002)). The subsequent merger wave had, by 2006, surpassed over ￿ve
times the value of the previous wave, reaching unprecedented levels. The existing theories proposed to
explain merger waves within the industrial organization literature consist of endogenous merger models
restricted to closed economy scenarios.7 This paper identi￿es an alternative possible explanation for
merger waves within an open economy scenario, namely, trade liberalization.
An important policy implication arises. At prohibitive tari⁄ levels, the diverging merger patterns across
the countries may engender con￿ icts of interest between the national anti-trust authorities. Consider
a scenario where the multinational dominant ￿rm belongs to a third country. Mergers in Home and
demergers in Foreign reduce consumer and producer surplus in Home and increase both in Foreign
respectively. The net e⁄ect on the welfare of the two countries is ambiguous. This creates a role for
an international anti-trust authority. Indeed, such situations have been a rising concern of international
organizations. At the 2003 Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a session
was held to discuss "Sustainable Competition Law", where it was proposed that the WTO develop
into an umbrella for international competition disciplines, and build mechanisms into the international
competition treaties to ensure that changes in industry structure at a global level are Pareto improving
(Gehring (2003)). Given a uniformly myopic industry, this model predicts that trade liberalization, by
aligning the post-merger industry structure across the countries, reduces the need for such supra-national
level intervention. However, these policy implications may be reversed if the ￿rms have heterogenous
discount factors.
Di⁄erent ￿rms within an industry may face di⁄erent credit constraints or possess asymmetric information
regarding the future. In reality, a dominant ￿rm may have deeper pockets than its followers and, being
the market leader, may have more information about its own future strategies than do the followers.
This paper, therefore, considers the scenario where, due to some combination of the above reasons, the
dominant ￿rm is more forward-looking than the fringe ￿rms. In this case, opening up the economy to
trade may not align post-merger capital shares across countries. This is because, if mergers in one country
a⁄ect the price of capital in the other, the dominant ￿rm and the fringe ￿rms, because they weigh the
7Exceptions include Bertrand and Zitouna (2006) and Neary (2007). In these papers mergers are driven by di⁄erences in
technology across ￿rms where low cost ￿rms buy out high cost foreign rivals as trade is liberalized. In contrast, this paper
shows that trade liberalization can trigger merger waves even when all ￿rms within an industry and across countries have
access to identical technologies.
5future di⁄erently, perceive the change in the value of capital di⁄erently. This causes the "cross-border
e⁄ect" itself to be modi￿ed. As long as the dominant ￿rm￿ s pre-merger capital share in one country
is small, opening up the economy, at best, fails to align the merger patterns. Numerical examples are
provided where trade liberalization causes the merger patterns in the two countries to diverge.
Second, of particular concern to antitrust authorities are scenarios where all ￿rms are equally myopic and
the dominant ￿rm has a su¢ ciently high pre-merger capital share in any one country. In such cases, trade
liberalization causes the industry to become signi￿cantly more concentrated by encouraging mergers in
both countries simultaneously. This result is driven by a combination of the "size" and "cross-border"
e⁄ects. If the dominant ￿rm has a larger pre-merger capital share in Home, then it has a greater incentive
to buy capital in Home than in Foreign (the "size e⁄ect"). Once it buys some capital at Home, the "cross-
border e⁄ect" ensures that the merger activity spreads from Home to Foreign and a wave of mergers is
generated. The lower the tari⁄, the easier it is for the "cross-border e⁄ect" to be set into motion.
Third, the anti-competitive e⁄ect of trade liberalization, given myopic ￿rms, is mitigated when ￿rms are
more forward-looking. The more forward-looking the fringe ￿rms, the more costly it is for the dominant
￿rm to buy capital (the "dynamic e⁄ect"). This e⁄ect dominates the other factors a⁄ecting merger
decisions as the discount factor rises. This results in demergers, regardless of the tari⁄ level, for a
su¢ ciently high discount factor that is common to all ￿rms.
By using a multi-period analysis, this paper thus highlights the importance of taking into consideration
the pre-merger industry structure and the rates at which individual ￿rms discount the future in forecasting
merger patterns in the face of trade liberalization and in determining international competition policy.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model.8 Sections 3 and 4 present the analysis at a
given tari⁄ level and the e⁄ects of trade liberalization respectively. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
There are two countries, Home and Foreign. There is a single dominant ￿rm that can produce and sell in
Home and Foreign, a competitive fringe in Home and a competitive fringe in Foreign. All ￿rms produce
homogenous products, resale of which is not allowed. The industry is modeled in partial equilibrium with
demand schedules in each country that are constant over time. A discrete time model is adopted. Firms
maximize their expected discounted value of pro￿ts. Each period consists of two stages. First stage:
Merger decisions are undertaken. Second stage: Investment and output decisions are undertaken. The
preferences and technology are discussed below, followed by a description of the equilibrium of the model.
Preferences and Technologies
The inverse demand is identical across the two countries. In Home, the inverse demand is given by
8For a list of the key variables used in this model, please refer to the Appendix (Part VII).
6p = P(Q); where Q represents total sales, including imports, in the Home market. Similarly, in Foreign,
the inverse demand is given by p￿ = P(Y ); where Y represents total sales in the Foreign market. The
tari⁄ level, t; is assumed to be equal in both countries and trade liberalization is assumed to be in the
form of bilateral tari⁄ reductions, that is, equal tari⁄ reductions in both countries.








units of capital located in Home (Foreign). The Home (Foreign) fringe is endowed
with Kh units of capital located in Home (Kf units located in Foreign). The fringes in both countries
consist of a continuum of ￿rms, each of which possesses an in￿nitesimally small proportion of the capital
stock. Thus each fringe ￿rm is a price taker in both the product and the capital markets.
Each ￿rm has access to the same production process represented by F(K;L); where K denotes industry-
speci￿c capital, and L denotes non-industry-speci￿c labor. This production process produces joint out-
puts: the consumption good, X; and future capital, Knext: I assume that the two outputs are produced
in ￿xed proportions, as in Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004). Let X = F(K;L) be the production of the
consumption good and Knext = ￿F(K;L) be the production of future capital, given inputs, K and L,
where 0 < ￿ < 1:9 Current capital is assumed to completely depreciate during the production process.10
The assumption of the two outputs being produced in ￿xed proportions simpli￿es the computation of the
model￿ s equilibrium signi￿cantly by essentially collapsing the investment and output decisions of each
￿rm into one.11
The production process, F(K;L); represents a constant returns to scale production process with F(0;L) =
F(K;0) = 0: It is assumed that F(K;L) is strictly concave and strictly increasing in K and L for K > 0
and L > 0: Also, it is assumed that limL!1 FL(K;L) = 0 and limL!0 FL(K;L) = 1 for any K > 0:
Let C(X;K) be the labor cost, corresponding to the given technology, of producing X units of the
consumption good and ￿X units of the capital good. That is, C(X;K) = !L0 for the L0 that solves
X = F(K;L0); given the competitive wage !. Given the assumptions on F(K;L), it follows that C(X;K)
is homogeneous of degree one in K; so that KC(X=K;1) = C(X;K): Lower case x denotes output per
unit of capital. Let c(x) = C(x;1) denote the labor cost per unit of capital necessary to produce x units
of the consumption good and ￿x units of the capital good. The assumptions on F(K;L) imply that c(x)
is strictly convex and strictly increasing, and that c0(0) = 0:
Equilibrium of the Model
The Markov-Perfect equilibria (MPE) of the model, in the sense of Maskin and Tirole (2001) are analyzed.
9As long as the production function is characterized by a su¢ ciently low elasticity of substitution between the capital
and consumption goods, it can be shown that the optimal choice of ￿ remains fairly constant for di⁄erent market structures.
10Alternatively, the interpretation of X could be the end-of-period capital. In this case, by de￿ning ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿; we could
interpret ￿ to be the rate of depreciation of the capital stock, with Knext = (1 ￿ ￿)X and ￿ representing the proportion of
end-of-period capital that survives into the next period.
11Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004) show that for the closed economy version of this model, their results hold qualitatively
when the assumption of ￿xed proportions is relaxed.
7In other words, only those equilibria in which the actions are functions solely of payo⁄-relevant state





d ) denote the pre-merger capital
stocks of the fringe and the dominant ￿rm, and let (Kh;Kf;Kh
d;K
f
d) denote the capital stocks after the
merger stage but before the investment/output stage. (Throughout the paper, the superscript "0" will
represent pre-merger values and the absence of the superscript will denote post-merger values.)12 The
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d: The state in each period of the model is represented by the shares of the total
capital stock held by the dominant and fringe ￿rms in each country. Let m0
h = Kh0










denote the proportions of the total industry capital stock held by the
dominant ￿rm before (after) the merger stage in Home and in Foreign respectively.
The discounted value of the future stream of pro￿ts of ￿rms is a function of the state variables, namely
mh; mf; K; and Kf: Henceforth, in order to simplify the notation, the arguments of the value functions
are not shown. De￿ne wd (w￿
d) to be the discounted value to the dominant ￿rm from its pro￿ts in the








d) represents the discounted value to the dominant ￿rm from its pro￿ts in the Home (Foreign) market
per unit of capital located in Home. Similarly, wx (w￿
x) denotes the discounted value to the dominant
￿rm from its pro￿ts in the Home (Foreign) market by selling goods that it produces in Foreign, and vx
(v￿
x) the corresponding values per unit of capital located in Foreign. Let vh and v￿
h be the discounted
values to a Home fringe ￿rm per unit of capital from Home pro￿ts (that is, pro￿ts made from selling the
consumption good in the Home market) and from Foreign pro￿ts respectively. Analogously, let vf and v￿
f
be the discounted values to a Foreign fringe ￿rm per unit of capital from Home pro￿ts and from Foreign
pro￿ts respectively.
The merger decision
During the merger process, the dominant ￿rm with market shares m0
h and m0
f chooses the post-merger
market shares, mh and mf. Given mh and mf; the amount of capital purchased by the dominant ￿rm in
Home is given by mhK ￿m0
hK and in Foreign is given by mfK ￿m0
fK: The equilibrium price of capital
in Home is given by:
ph
K = vh + v￿
h (1)
At equilibrium, in order to buy a fringe ￿rm, the dominant ￿rm must pay the value that the fringe ￿rm
would get post-merger, if the fringe ￿rm decided to remain outside the merger. It is only at this price
that the Home fringe ￿rm is indi⁄erent amongst buying, selling and holding onto its capital. Thus, at
equilibrium, the price of each unit of Home capital equals the post-merger value of each unit of capital to
12The notation is kept similar to that used by Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004) to facilitate the comparison of results.
8the Home fringe ￿rm, as shown in (1). Similarly, the equilibrium price of capital in Foreign is given by:
p
f
K = vf + v￿
f (2)
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The ￿rst two terms are the dominant ￿rm￿ s return if it enters the investment/production stage with
shares of mh and mf. The third term subtracts the amount spent on the acquisition of capital from the
Home fringe. The fourth term subtracts the amount spent on the acquisition of capital from the Foreign





Once the dominant ￿rm chooses mh = ~ mh(m0
h;m0
f;K;Kf) and mf = ~ mf(m0
h;m0
f;K;Kf); it sets the
price of capital in each country according to (1) and (2). It commits to buy (sell) as much capital as the









= vh(~ mh; ~ mf;K;Kf) + v￿
h(~ mh; ~ mf;K;Kf) (4)
13To explain (4), let us consider the case where the dominant ￿rm wishes to buy (~ mh K ￿ m
0
h K) > 0 units of capital
from the Home fringe. The dominant ￿rm sets p
h
K = vh(~ mh; ~ mf; K; Kf) + v
￿















f; K; Kf); however, then the Home fringe ￿rms lose per unit of capital sold to
the dominant ￿rm. As a result, at this price, the dominant ￿rm cannot induce any of the fringe ￿rms to sell their capital.















f; K; Kf); it becomes pro￿table for the Home fringe ￿rms to sell each unit of capital
to the dominant ￿rm. Thus, all fringe ￿rms o⁄er their capital for sale. Given that the dominant ￿rm has precomitted to
buying all capital that is supplied at this price, it must buy up all the capital from the fringe instead of buying the optimal
amount, (~ mhK ￿ m
0
hK): Only when (4) is satis￿ed can the dominant ￿rm induce the Home fringe ￿rms to sell exaclty
(~ mhK ￿ m
0
hK) units of capital at the capital market equilibrium. By similar reasoning, for the Foreign capital market to








= vf(~ mh; ~ mf;K;Kf) + v￿
f(~ mh; ~ mf;K;Kf) (5)
The output/ investment decision
Let qd and q￿
d (x and x￿) denote the sales, in the Home and Foreign markets respectively, of the dominant
￿rm per unit of capital possessed, which are produced using capital located in Home (Foreign). Let q and
q￿ (y and y￿) denote the sales in the Home and in the Foreign market respectively of the Home (Foreign)
fringe ￿rms per unit of capital. When the fringe ￿rms make their output decisions, the dominant ￿rm
has already made its move. The fringe ￿rms take the dominant ￿rm￿ s decisions as given when making
their own output decisions. Let ~ q(qd; x; q￿
d; x￿; mh; mf; K; Kf) and ~ q￿(qd; x; q￿
d; x￿; mh; mf; K; Kf)
denote the equilibrium level of sales of each Home fringe ￿rm in Home and Foreign markets respectively,
given the dominant ￿rm￿ s choices and the state of the model. Analogously, ~ y(qd; x; q￿
d; x￿; mh; mf; K;
Kf) and ~ y￿(qd; x; q￿
d; x￿; mh; mf; K; Kf) denote the equilibrium level of sales of each Foreign fringe ￿rm
in Home and Foreign markets respectively. Henceforth, in order to simplify the notation, the arguments
of the equilibrium output functions are not shown.
In each market, since each fringe ￿rm is in￿nitessimally small, it takes the current prices, p and p￿; and
the value of capital next period as given. The Home fringe ￿rm￿ s choices of the level of sales in each
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In (6), ￿ denotes the discount factor. Unless otherwise mentioned, for the rest of the paper it is assumed
that all ￿rms have the same discount factor, ￿: A choice of the level of sales in the Home market, q; yields
current revenues of pq: Similarly, a choice of the level of sales in the Foreign market, q￿; yields current
revenues of (p￿ ￿ t)q￿: The current cost of producing (q + q￿) units is given by c(q + q￿): Together, the
choices q and q￿ also yield ￿(q + q￿) units of capital next period by the ￿xed proportions technology
assumption, each unit of which will be worth (v0
h;next + v￿0
h;next):
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10In (6) and (7) the following hold:
p = P(Q)
p￿ = P(Y )
Q = mhKqd + mfKx + ((1 ￿ mh ￿ mf)K ￿ Kf) ~ q + Kf~ y
Y = mfKq￿






























Knext = ￿(Q + Y )
Kf;next = ￿mfK (x + x￿) + ￿Kf~ y￿ + ￿Kf~ y
9
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ;
(8)
Now let us turn to the dominant ￿rm￿ s output/investment decision. Unlike the fringe ￿rms, the dominant
￿rm recognizes that its choice of output a⁄ects the current and future prices, and also the fringe supply.
Given the fringe ￿rms￿reactions, ~ q; ~ q￿; ~ y and ~ y￿; the dominant ￿rm￿ s choices of the output levels to sell
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subject to the same conditions as set out in (8) except that prices are now functions of the quantities
chosen by the dominant ￿rm.













x ; ~ q; ~ q￿; ~ y; ~ y￿; ~ qd; ~ q￿
d; ~ x; ~ x￿; ~ mh; ~ mf)
11such that the following conditions hold.




f solve (4) and (5).
2. The per-unit-of-capital values vh;v￿
h;vf;v￿
f are the values that solve (6) and (7) for qd;q￿
d;x;x￿
evaluated at qd = ~ qd(mh; mf; K; Kf); q￿
d = ~ q￿
d(mh; mf; K; Kf); x = ~ x(mh; mf; K; Kf) and
x￿ = ~ x￿ (mh; mf; K; Kf):
3. The per-unit-of-capital values vd; v￿
d; vx; v￿
x solve (9).





5. The policy functions ~ q(qd; x; q￿
d; x￿; mh; mf; K; Kf); ~ q￿(qd; x; q￿
d; x￿; mh; mf; K; Kf); ~ y(qd; x; q￿
d;
x￿; mh; mf; K; Kf); ~ y￿(qd; x; q￿
d; x￿; mh; mf; K; Kf) solve (6) and (7).
6. The policy functions ~ qd(mh; mf; K; Kf); ~ q￿
d(mh; mf; K; Kf); ~ x(mh; mf; K; Kf); ~ x￿(mh; mf; K;
Kf) solve (9).
7. The policy functions ~ mh(m0
h; m0
f; K; Kf); ~ mf(m0
h; m0
f; K; Kf) solve (3).
3 Merger Activity at a given tari⁄ level
This section discusses the factors driving merger decisions at any given tari⁄ level. Having determined
these, I will examine the e⁄ects of trade liberalization in the following section.
The Single Period Case
Let us begin by characterizing the version of this model which consists of a single-period. The single-
period version is equivalent to a static framework. It is also equivalent to the case where all ￿rms are
completely myopic, that is, where the discount factor is equal to zero. This version is analytically more
tractable than the multi-period version, and the analysis presented in this section allows me to illustrate
the key forces driving merger decisions in this model.
When analyzing the single period case, K is normalized to 1 for notational convenience. It is noted that
in the single-period version of the model, K does not change. With K = 1; mh and mf represent the
dominant ￿rm￿ s capital levels as well as shares.
Let us begin by noting that it is not possible to simultaneously have q￿
d > 0 and x > 0 at the equilibrium
when mh = mf. The fact that, in any country, by selling goods that have been locally produced (denoted
by qd and x￿); the dominant ￿rm can avoid paying the tari⁄, t;which it must pay per unit exported
(denoted by q￿
d and x) drives this result.
I then proceed to show that a perfectly competitive industry structure is an absorbing state, as stated in
Proposition 1, the proof of which follows from Lemma 1.14
14This result is similar to that obtained by Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004) for the closed economy case.
12Lemma 1: A dominant ￿rm with either mh > 0 or mf > 0; or both, has MRd < p; MRx < p; MR￿
d < p￿,
and MR￿
x < p￿ and hence, qd < q; x < y; q￿
d < q￿ and x￿ < y￿:
Proof: See Appendix (Part I).
Lemma 1 shows that, given the industry price, the fringe ￿rms always sell more consumption goods per
unit of capital than the dominant ￿rm in each market. This follows from the fact that the fringe ￿rms
set price to marginal cost in each market whereas the dominant ￿rm sets marginal revenue to marginal
cost.15 A direct implication of Lemma 1 is that the average value per unit of capital is higher for the
fringe ￿rms than for the dominant ￿rm. That is,
vd < vh; v￿
d < v￿
h; vx < vf; v￿
x < v￿
f (10)
Proposition 1: The equilibrium merger policy functions ~ mh(m0
h; m0
f; K; Kf) and ~ mf(m0
h; m0
f; K; Kf)
satisfy ~ mh(0; 0; K; Kf) = ~ mf(0; 0; K; Kf) = 0:
Proof: For the case of m0
h = m0
f = 0; the dominant ￿rm￿ s problem, (3) is given by:
max
mh;mf
mh (vd + v￿
d) + mf (vx + v￿
x) ￿ mh(vh + v￿
h) ￿ mf(vf + v￿
f)
From (10) it follows that ~ mh(0;0;K;Kf) = ~ mf(0;0;K;Kf) = 0 is the unique solution to the dominant
￿rm￿ s problem. ￿
Proposition 1 can be explained as follows. The proportion of the industry-speci￿c capital stock that is
owned by the dominant ￿rm is a⁄ected by the following two factors: the merger decisions made in the
￿rst stage within each period and the investment decisions made in the second stage.16 In the merger
stage, in order to buy a fringe ￿rm, the dominant ￿rm must pay the value that the fringe ￿rm would get
post-merger, if the fringe ￿rm decided to remain outside the merger. Since the dominant ￿rm earns less
per unit of capital than each fringe ￿rm, as shown by (10), it has to pay the fringe ￿rm a higher price
than it can earn per unit of capital. A large dominant ￿rm might still ￿nd it pro￿table to buy capital
since, by undertaking the merger, it can raise the price of the consumption good and thereby increase
the value of all the units of capital owned by itself before the merger. However, for a dominant ￿rm with
very small pre-merger capital shares in both countries buying capital necessarily engenders a loss. This
is the "free rider" e⁄ect at work and explains why no merger is realized when the industry is perfectly
competitive. Also, by Lemma 1, we have that the dominant ￿rm invests at a lower rate than the fringe
15A more detailed interpretation of Lemma 1 is included in the Appendix (Part 1).
16In this model, industry concentration is in￿ uenced by internal investment decisions of ￿rms. This feature is similar to
that of Kydland (1979).
13￿rm. Thus, the capital shares of the dominant ￿rm in both countries are necessarily lower subsequent to
the investment stage than they were subsequent to the merger stage. This, together with the fact that
no mergers occur when the industry is perfectly competitive to begin with, implies that once the capital
shares of the dominant ￿rm in both countries approach zero, they remain at this level over time.
The paper then proceeds to examine what happens when the dominant ￿rm has a strictly positive pre-
merger capital share in at least one of the countries. Given a single closed economy, small mergers are
always pro￿table in the single period model.17 In the open economy case, however, the dominant ￿rm
does not always have the incentive to undertake positive mergers in any given country. In order to
understand the dominant ￿rm￿ s incentive to merge, the marginal bene￿t from buying a unit of Home
capital is computed as follows. The Home-merger-Marginal-Bene￿t is de￿ned to be the slope of the
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Let us examine the components of Ah: If the dominant ￿rm buys one more unit of Home capital, it earns
a pro￿t of vd+v￿
d on this new unit, since this new unit of capital can be used to produce and sell goods in
both Home and Foreign markets. Buying the capital from the Home fringe ￿rm costs vh + v￿
h. Together,
the term (vd + v￿
d ￿ vh ￿ v￿
h) represents the "free-rider e⁄ect". That is, this term shows the incentive of the
dominant ￿rm to not buy capital from the fringe ￿rms since, as shown by (10), (vd + v￿
d ￿ vh ￿ v￿
h) < 0:
Acquiring this new unit of capital drives up the pro￿t per unit of capital that the dominant ￿rm takes
into the output/investment stage in each market: ( d
dmh (vd + v￿
d) and d
dmh (vx + v￿
x)). This is due to the
market power gained by the dominant ￿rm, which allows it to cut production and drive up the industry
price. This is labeled the "market power e⁄ect" inducing the dominant ￿rm to buy capital from the fringe
￿rms. Even though, it follows from Lemma 1 that the average value per unit of capital is higher for the
fringe ￿rm than for the dominant ￿rm, it can be shown that the marginal bene￿t of transferring one unit
of capital from the fringe to the dominant ￿rm is higher than the fringe value of this capital, that is,
Ah > 0.18 The last two terms in (11) illustrate how buying a unit of Home capital allows the dominant









labeled the "cross-border e⁄ect".
17Refer to Proposition 2 of Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004).
18See Lemma 2 in the Appendix (Part II) for a formal proof.
14Similarly, the Foreign-merger-Marginal-Bene￿t is de￿ned to be the slope of the dominant ￿rm￿ s merger
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By similar reasoning as to why Ah > 0, it follows that Af > 0.
The dominant ￿rm simultaneously decides how much capital to buy/sell in both countries. By comparing



























on the dominant ￿rm￿ s merger decisions in the two countries. This is labeled
the "size e⁄ect", alluding to the fact that the dominant ￿rm￿ s future merger decisions are dependent
on the relative sizes of its existing capital shares across the two countries. Further discussion about the
"free-rider", "market power", "size" and "cross-border" e⁄ects are postponed until the following section,
where numerical examples are used to illustrate the mechanisms by which they a⁄ect merger outcomes
in this model.
In the following analysis, it is shown that, unlike for the closed economy, it might be optimal for the
dominant ￿rm to sell capital, in the single period case, in any one of the countries or simultaneously in








dmf . This section is restricted to
illustrating the di⁄erent possibilities in terms of equilibrium merger patterns that might emerge in this
model. The intuitions behind these results are further developed in the following section with the help
of numerical examples.























































dmh = y￿ dp￿
dmh.








dmf ; there arise four possible cases.
Table 1
Case A B C D
Bh > 0 > 0 < 0 < 0
Bf > 0 < 0 > 0 < 0
There exist functional forms of demand and supply for which all of the above cases are possible. In the
following section, a numerical example is presented using constant elasticity demand and supply where
there exist ranges of mh and mf for which each of the cases A-D occur.







Proof: See Appendix (Part III).
Proposition 2 determines the conditions under which it is optimal for the dominant ￿rm to sell capital
in both countries simultaneously. This occurs when, by selling capital in one country, the dominant ￿rm
raises the price of capital in the other country. This is only possible given Case D. Moreover, Proposition
2 shows that it is only when the dominant ￿rm sells a su¢ ciently large amount of capital in one of the
countries that it is able to su¢ ciently raise the price of capital in the other, such that it becomes lucrative
for the dominant ￿rm to start selling capital in the other country.






dmf > 0 and
dp￿
dmf > 0: Proposition 2, thus,
shows that it is not optimal for the dominant ￿rm to simultaneously sell capital in both countries if the
market prices of the consumption good in both countries are strictly increasing in mh and mf: Under
these conditions, by buying new capital, the dominant ￿rm drives up the price of capital in both the
markets. In this case, the last two terms of (11) and of (12) illustrate the monopsony power of the
dominant ￿rm: that is, as the dominant ￿rm buys capital in any country, it drives up the price of capital
in both countries. If zero mergers are realized in both countries, the monopsony e⁄ect is zero. Thus, a
small merger in Home and/or in Foreign is always better than zero mergers in both countries. Also, it is
never optimal for the dominant ￿rm to sell o⁄ capital in Home (Foreign) if there is a sell-o⁄ in Foreign
(Home), since then the monopsony power e⁄ect would be non-negative.
Proposition 3: The dominant ￿rm buys capital in both countries i⁄
































































Proof: See Appendix (Part IV).
Unlike the scenario where the dominant ￿rm sells capital in both countries, as presented by Proposition
2, it might be optimal for the dominant ￿rm to buy capital in both countries given any of Cases A -







dmf > 0 and
dp￿
dmf > 0; Proposition 3(i) implies that if the
dominant ￿rm is buying capital in both countries, the mergers in each country must be su¢ ciently small.
This is because, by buying capital in one country, the dominant ￿rm increases the price of capital in
both. Thus, as capital is bought in any one country, it becomes more expensive to buy more capital in






dmf < 0 and
dp￿
dmf < 0; Case D is obtained. For Case
D, Proposition 3(iv) implies that if the dominant ￿rm is buying capital in both countries, the mergers in
each country must be su¢ ciently large. This is because, by buying enough capital in any one country,
the dominant ￿rm is able to decrease the price of capital in the other.
Having determined the conditions under which the dominant ￿rm either buys or sells capital simulta-
neously in both countries, I ask whether it is possible that the dominant ￿rm buys capital in any one
country whilst selling capital in the other. Without loss of generality, I focus on the case where the
dominant ￿rm buys capital in Home and sells capital in Foreign. By symmetry, the pattern of mergers
and demergers is reversed if the conditions given in Proposition 4 corresponding to Home are applied to
17Foreign and vice versa.
Proposition 4: The dominant ￿rm buys capital in Home and sells in Foreign i⁄
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(iii) Given Case C, (20) is satis￿ed.
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Proof: See Appendix (Part V).
Proposition 4 determines the conditions under which the dominant ￿rm buys capital in one country and






dmf > 0 and
dp￿
dmf > 0; Case A is obtained. Proposition
4(i) can be explained as follows. As the dominant ￿rm buys Home capital, it raises the price of both
Home and Foreign capital. The rising price of Home capital limits the dominant ￿rm from buying all the
capital in Home. The upper limit of the amount of Home capital bought by the dominant ￿rm is given
by Dh in (21): The rising price of Foreign capital makes it more pro￿table for the dominant ￿rm to sell
Foreign capital. The amount of Foreign capital sold depends on the relative magnitudes of Ah; Af; Bh;






dmf < 0 and
dp￿
dmf < 0;
Case D is obtained. Intuitively, Proposition 4(iv) can be explained as follows. As the dominant ￿rm buys
Home capital, it decreases the price of both Home and Foreign capital. The dominant ￿rm wishes to take
18advantage of this low price of Home capital. It requires funds in order to purchase more Home capital.
The dominant ￿rm, therefore, sells Foreign capital in order to ￿nance its purchase of Home capital. The
amount of Foreign capital sold depends on the relative magnitudes of Ah; Af; Bh; Bf; Ch and Cf; as
shown by (25):
























slopes of the Foreign ￿ merger Marginal Bene￿t with respect to m0
h and m0





















So far I have restricted my attention to the single period case. Now let us turn to the multi-period case.
The Multi-Period Case
In the multi-period case, the equilibrium of the model is given by the same conditions as shown in Section
2, except that all policy functions and value functions must be indexed by time, ￿; e.g. vd;￿(mh;￿;mf;￿;K￿;Kf;￿):
An in￿nite horizon scenario is considered.
In the context of the multi-period scenario, it is possible to examine the evolution of industry structure
through time. I note that, as in the single period case, an industry that begins at perfect competition
remains perfectly competitive. The proof is very similar to that of Proposition 1, and therefore, is not
included.
The main point of departure from the single period case is that in the multi-period case, the dominant
￿rm has a signi￿cantly greater incentive to sell capital. This has been shown for the single closed economy
model (see Proposition 5(ii), Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004)). For the single closed economy case, as
￿ ! 0; the dominant ￿rm always buys capital. However, Proposition 5(ii) of Gowrisankaran and Holmes
(2004) shows that there exists a threshold value of ￿; less than 1, above which the dominant ￿rm sells
capital. This can be explained as follows. If fringe ￿rms are forward-looking, they behave di⁄erently
subsequent to a merger than if they were myopic. Forward-looking fringe ￿rms expect the dominant
￿rm to cut production in future periods. Also, a merger raises the price of capital and signals that the
dominant ￿rm might continue to buy capital from the fringe in the future. This encourages the fringe
￿rms to invest at a higher rate. If the industry is close to being monopolized, so that the fringes in each
country are negligibly small, or if the discount rate is very low, indicating that fringe ￿rms do not attach
a high weight to the future, then the dominant ￿rm does not need to worry about this aspect of fringe
behavior. Otherwise, to discourage such behavior of the fringe, the dominant ￿rm has an additional
incentive to sell capital than in the single period scenario. This is the "dynamic e⁄ect".
There is no reason for the above intuition to be modi￿ed in the open economy scenario. By this reasoning,
I expect the dominant ￿rm to have a greater incentive to sell capital in both countries than in the single
period case. In line with my expectations, the simulation results, presented in the following section, show
19that, at any given tari⁄ level and for any given combination of pre-merger capital shares m0
h and m0
f; the
post-merger capital shares, mh and mf; are lower at higher levels of ￿: This can be seen by comparing
Figure 1(a) to 2 (a) and Figures 1(b) to 2 (b) respectively.
Having examined some of the characteristics of the equilibrium of this model, let us proceed to investigate
the e⁄ects of trade liberalization on merger activity. Ideally, the e⁄ect of marginal tari⁄ reductions on
the marginal bene￿ts of merging in Home and in Foreign should be computed by partially di⁄erentiating
(11) and (12) with respect to the tari⁄level. However, in order to proceed with the analysis, assumptions




@mf@t: Since these are not intuitively obvious, I follow a
di⁄erent approach by computing the equilibrium of the model at di⁄erent tari⁄ levels.19
4 The E⁄ect of Trade Liberalization
For the numerical analysis,20 constant elasticity demand and cost functions are used. This facilitates
comparison between the closed and open economy results.
P(Q) = Q￿ 1
"





The results yielded by the numerical analysis support Propositions 1-4. I present below the results for the
case where K = 1
2(Kmon + Kcomp); where Kmon refers to the amount of capital that would be produced
if the dominant ￿rm owned all the capital stock and Kcomp refers to the amount of capital that would be
produced if the industry were perfectly competitive, " = 4; ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 0:8:
In this section, attention is restricted to the case where the two countries are identical in all but one
respect. Although the demand, production technology and capital stock are equal across countries, the
dominant ￿rm is allowed to hold di⁄erent pre-merger capital shares in the two countries. Since the two
countries possess equal capital stocks and given that capital is immobile across the border, neither mh
nor mf can rise above 0.5. I ￿nd that merger decisions are exactly symmetric in the following sense:
~ mf(m0
h; m0
f; K; Kf) = ~ mh(m0
f; m0
h; K; Kf): This is not surprising since the two countries have identical
demand and capital stocks.
It is shown that the e⁄ect of trade liberalization is dependent on the pre-merger capital shares, m0
h and
19I follow the method used by Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004) to compute the equilibrium, the details of which are
discussed in Appendix Part VI.
20In order to proceed with the numerical analysis the following restriction is imposed, which greatly increases the speed of
convergence of the algorithm: the fringe ￿rms are not allowed to export. Often there exist high ￿xed costs to exporting, such
as surveying the foreign market and interacting with retail outlets in the importing country. This restriction thus re￿ ects
this feature of reality. Under this restriction, (that is, setting v
￿
h; vf; q
￿ and y to zero), it is straightforward to show that
Lemmas 1 and 2 and Proposition 1-4 hold.
20m0
f; and on the discount factor, ￿: I proceed by ￿rst presenting the results for cases where all ￿rms have
a common discount factor which approaches zero. I then present the results for cases where all ￿rms have
a strictly positive discount factor. Finally, I discuss the case where the dominant ￿rm is relatively more
forward-looking than the fringe ￿rms.
Scenario 1: ￿ ! 0
The e⁄ect of trade liberalization on mergers when the discount factor is su¢ ciently close to zero is
illustrated by Figures 1(a)-1(b) and Tables 2-4. Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show the e⁄ect of tari⁄ reductions
on mf and mh respectively for di⁄erent values of m0
f, holding m0
h constant at 0.26.21 Tables 2-4 provide
a more holistic picture by varying both m0
h and m0
f simultaneously. I begin by analyzing Figures 1(a)
and 1(b).
Figure 1(a): Effect of trade liberalization on m f for

































































Figure 1(b): Effect of trade liberalization on m h for

































































Result 1: Tari⁄ reduction from a prohibitive to a non-prohibitive level aligns post-merger capital shares
across countries.
In Figures 1(a) and 1(b), t = 0:15 represents the lowest tari⁄ level (upto three decimal places) at which
all exports fall to zero, given my parameter values. At this tari⁄ level, exports of the consumption good
fall to zero so that Home and Foreign become two closed economies. I note that, although there is no
trade between the two countries at prohibitive tari⁄ levels, merger activity in each country is dependent
on merger activity in the other, unlike in the case of a single closed economy as studied by Gowrisankaran
and Holmes (2004). This is because, in the two-country case, the dominant ￿rm is able to ￿nance its
purchases of capital in one country by selling capital in the other.
In this model, given a prohibitive tari⁄, the "size" and "market power" e⁄ects become the driving forces
behind the merger decisions of the dominant ￿rm. When the dominant ￿rm has a large pre-merger capital
share in Foreign (that is, m0
f is high) then it has a greater incentive to buy more capital in Foreign than
in Home. This is because the gain in market power as a result of buying each additional unit of Foreign
capital increases the value of all the units of capital owned pre-merger by the dominant ￿rm in Foreign.
21Recall that m
0
h can range from 0 to 0.5. We choose m
0
h = 0:26 in Figures 1(a) - 1(b) since it approaches the mid-point
of this range. For merger patterns that result from m
0
h signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0.26, please refer to Tables 2-3:
21This explains why, in Figure 1(a), the dominant ￿rm buys capital in Foreign for 0:24 < m0
f < 0:45: In
this range of m0
f; the dominant ￿rm sells capital in Home to ￿nance its purchase of capital in Foreign.
It is more pro￿table for the dominant ￿rm to consolidate its capital in one country, rather than having
moderate capital shares in both countries and sharing both markets with the fringe ￿rms. For m0
f < 0:24
and given m0
h = 0:26; by the same reasoning, it becomes optimal for the dominant ￿rm to sell capital
in Foreign in order to buy capital in Home. Thus, at the prohibitive tari⁄, for m0
f 2 (0;0:45); when the
dominant ￿rm buys capital in one country, it sells capital in the other, as shown by Figures 1(a) and
1(b).
An exception occurs for m0
f 2 (0:45;0:5): As the pre-merger Foreign capital share of the dominant ￿rm
approaches 0.5, the size e⁄ect is o⁄set by the free rider e⁄ect, which causes the dominant ￿rm to start
selling capital in Foreign. As m0
f ! 0:5, the pre-merger price of the consumption good in both markets
rises. Thus, at levels of m0
f close to 0.5, the price of capital is high. The dominant ￿rm ￿nds it optimal
to sacri￿ce its market power in the consumption goods market in order to gain from the capital market,
by selling capital in both countries at this high price.
Unlike the case for prohibitive tari⁄s, at non-prohibitive tari⁄ levels the merger patterns are almost
identical across both countries. Given the numerical example, this holds for all t 2 [0;0:15): Figures
1(a) and 1(b) illustrate this for t = 0; 0.03, 0.05 and 0.1, given m0
f 2 (0;0:5) and m0
h = 0:26. This
is because total sales in the Home (Foreign) market is monotonically increasing in mf (mh): In Figure
1(a), there is a merger in Foreign at m0
h = 0:26 and m0
f = 0:4 at all non-prohibitive tari⁄ levels. At
t = 0:1; for example, this merger is followed by an increase in total Home sales of approximately 0.02%.
Similar increases in Home sales are noted at all non-prohibitive tari⁄ levels. Consequently, the price of
the consumption good in the Home market falls. This causes the value of the Home fringe ￿rms to fall,
thereby causing the price of Home capital to fall. This is the "cross-border e⁄ect" at work. Consequently
it becomes cheaper for the dominant ￿rm to buy the Home fringe ￿rms. Thus, a merger in Foreign leads
to mergers in Home. This has a feedback e⁄ect, by similar reasoning, on mergers in Foreign and so on.
Exports, thus, act as a mechanism for transfering merger activity from one country to another, thereby
aligning merger patterns across the countries. This leads to Result 2.
Result 2: Tari⁄ reduction from a prohibitive to a non-prohibitive level initiates merger (or demerger)
waves.
In Figures 1(a) and 1(b), at the prohibitive tari⁄, the dominant ￿rm is content to hold moderate levels
of post-merger capital share in any one of the countries for any given m0
f: However, at non-prohibitive
tari⁄ levels, the dominant ￿rm chooses to hold capital shares in both countries that either approach zero
or the maximum value of 0.5. At any given m0
f; the "cross-border e⁄ect" sets into motion a cycle or
wave of mergers or demergers through the feedback mechanism driven by exports. For a given set of
parameter values, when faced with two closed economies, there are no merger waves. However, opening
22up the economies generates merger (or demerger) waves simultaneously in both countries.
Result 3: For moderate values of m0
h and m0
f; the e⁄ect of tari⁄ reduction on post-merger capital shares
is non-monotonic in the tari⁄ level.
The non-monotonicity mentioned in Result 3 occurs when the tari⁄ level jumps from a prohibitive to a
non-prohibitive level. This is illustrated by Figures 1(a) and 1(b) for m0
f 2 (0:2; 0:4): For this range of
m0
f; Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show that a reduction from a prohibitive tari⁄ to t = 0:1 causes mf to fall to
zero whereas a jump to free trade causes mf to rise to 0.5.
So far I have focused on the results for a given value of m0
h: Now I turn to a more holistic analysis by
varying both m0
h and m0
f simultaneously. Results 4-6 are illustrated by Tables 2-3, which summarize the
merger decisions of the dominant ￿rm at t = 0 and t = 0:1 respectively for di⁄erent combinations of
pre-merger shares in the two countries. Table 2 shows the optimal capital shares for ￿ = 0:01 and t = 0:
Table 2: Optimal Capital Shares at t = 0
m0
h = 0:04 m0
h = 0:46
m0
f = 0:04 ~ mh = ~ mf = 0:003 ~ mh = 0:38; ~ mf = 0:5
m0
f=0:46 ~ mh = 0:5; ~ mf = 0:38 ~ mh = ~ mf = 0:5
Table 3 shows the optimal capital shares for ￿ = 0:01 and t = 0:1:
Table 3: Optimal Capital Shares at t = 0:1
m0
h = 0:04 m0
h = 0:46
m0
f = 0:04 ~ mh = ~ mf = 0:01 ~ mh = 0:009; ~ mf = 0
m0
f=0:46 ~ mh = 0; ~ mf = 0:009 ~ mh = ~ mf = 0:5
Result 4: As m0
h ! 0 and m0
f ! 0, tari⁄ reduction reduces the dominant ￿rm￿ s incentive to undertake
mergers.
Tables 2 and 3 together show that for m0
h = m0
f = 0:04; trade liberalization does not encourage the
dominant ￿rm to undertake mergers in either country. Going from t = 0:1 to free trade, the post-merger
capital shares of the dominant ￿rm in both countries falls from 0:01 to 0:003: As m0
h ! 0 and m0
f ! 0,
at any given tari⁄ level, the "size e⁄ect" is negligibly small and outweighed by the "free-rider e⁄ect".
23Starting from m0
h = m0
f = 0:04; the dominant ￿rm does not wish to buy capital in either one of the
countries or in both countries simultaneously. This is because, as it buys capital, the dominant ￿rm
raises the price of capital. As m0
h ! 0 and m0
f ! 0, this example illustrates that, at non-prohibitive tari⁄
levels, total sales in the Home (Foreign) market is decreasing in mf (mh): At t = 0:1; for example, going
from (mf = 0;mh = 0) to (mf = 0:04;mh = 0), total Home sales, Q; fall by 6%. Consequently, the values
per unit of capital of Home and Foreign fringe ￿rms are increasing in mf and mh respectively as m0
h ! 0
and m0
f ! 0. Recall that the post-merger values of the fringe ￿rms represent the price that the dominant
￿rm must pay to acquire each unit of capital. Starting from m0
h = m0
f = 0:04; buying capital in both
countries simultaneously, thus, proves to be infeasible for the dominant ￿rm. If either m0
h or m0
f were
large, then the gain in market power through the "size e⁄ect" could o⁄set the increasing cost of buying
capital. This is illustrated by Result 5 below. The gain in market power (through a higher post-merger
price of the consumption good) is applicable only to the pre-merger stock of capital belonging to the
dominant ￿rm. In the case of m0
h ! 0 and m0
f ! 0; this gain is too small to outweigh the increasing cost
of buying capital. The only way that the rising price of capital does not deter the dominant ￿rm is if
it can ￿nance its purchases of capital in one country by selling capital in the other. For the case where
m0
h ! 0 and m0
f ! 0; this possibility is also ruled out for the dominant ￿rm.
As tari⁄ is reduced and the volume of exports grows, the capital owned by the dominant ￿rm which
is located in Home essentially competes against that located in Foreign. If the dominant ￿rm buys
more Home (Foreign) capital, then it hurts its Foreign (Home) capital holdings by taking away the
sales of the Foreign (Home) capital through exports. The lower the tari⁄ level, the greater the volume
of exports. At t = 0:1; for example, moving from m0
h = m0
f = 0:04 to m0




h = 0:04 and m0
f = 0:24
￿
leaves exports unchanged at zero. In contrast, at t = 0; moving from
m0
h = m0
f = 0:04 to mh = 0:24 and mf = 0:04 (or mh = 0:04 and mf = 0:24) increases exports from
Home (Foreign) to Foreign (Home) from zero to 0:635; which causes per unit value of the Foreign (Home)
capital held by the dominant ￿rm to fall by 69:23%: This loss outweighs any gain in market power
resulting from the merger. Thus, at lower tari⁄s, there is an additional factor reducing the incentive of
the dominant ￿rm to undertake mergers.
In fact, in this example, at any given tari⁄ level, the revenue from selling capital is greater than the gain
in market power due to merger. As implied by the above discussion, the merger-induced gain is smaller
at lower tari⁄s. Thus, the dominant ￿rm sells more capital at t = 0 than at t = 0:1, so that post-merger
capital share in both countries fall by 64:943% as a result of trade liberalization. However, this pro-
competitive e⁄ect of trade liberalization only occurs for a small range of m0
h and m0
f close to zero and
the magnitude of this e⁄ect is very small compared to the anti-competitive e⁄ect of trade liberalization
that occurs for other combinations of m0
h and m0
f; as shown below:
Result 5: As either (m0
h ! 0 and m0
f ! 0:5) or as (m0
h ! 0:5 and m0
f ! 0), at non-prohibitive tari⁄
24levels, tari⁄ reduction increases the incentive to merge simultaneously in both countries.
The anti-competitive e⁄ect, as mentioned in Result 5, is driven by a combination of the "size " and "cross-
border" e⁄ects. Consider the case where m0
h ! 0 and m0
f ! 0:5: The dominant ￿rm has a greater incen-
tive to buy capital in Foreign than in Home, due to the "size e⁄ect". This example illustrates, that the per
unit value of Home (Foreign) capital is monotonically decreasing (increasing) in m0
f. At t = 0; a purchase
of Foreign capital as represented by a move from
￿
m0
h = 0:04; m0
f = 0:46
￿
to (mh = 0:04; mf = 0:5)
results in (vd + v￿
d) falling by 0:003 and (vx + v￿
x) rising by 0:009 causing (vd + v￿
d + vx + v￿
x) to rise by
approximately 2%: That is, the gain in market power by buying Foreign capital applicable to all units
of Foreign capital owned pre-merger by the dominant ￿rm (the "size e⁄ect") outweighs the harm caused
by this merger to the value of Home capital as a result of increased post-merger exports from Foreign to
Home. Thus, the "size e⁄ect" induces the dominant ￿rm to buy Foreign capital.
As illustrated by Result 2, once the dominant ￿rm starts buying capital in Foreign, the "cross-border
e⁄ect" ensures that a wave of mergers follows simultaneously in both countries. The result is that the
dominant ￿rm buys all the fringe ￿rms and becomes an international monopoly. The greater the volume
of exports, the greater the gain from buying a unit of Foreign capital. Besides gaining market power in
Foreign, the dominant ￿rm also gains market share in Home by increasing exports post-merger. That is,
the increase in (vx + v￿
x) as a result of buying Foreign capital is greater the lower the tari⁄level. At t = 0:1;
the rise in (vx + v￿
x) due to a move from
￿
m0
h = 0:04; m0
f = 0:46
￿
to (mh = 0:04; mf = 0:5) is given by
0:002 (as opposed to 0:009 for t = 0). This makes it easier for the merger wave to be initiated at lower tari⁄
levels. This is illustrated in Figures 1(a) and 1(b) where the merger wave is initiated at successively lower
levels of pre-merger capital shares as the tari⁄ level is reduced. This also explains the merger pattern
illustrated in Tables 2 and 3. Starting from m0




h = 0:46 and m0
f = 0:04
￿
trade liberalization from t = 0:1 to t = 0 causes post-merger capital shares of the dominant ￿rm to rise
simultaneously in both countries with ~ mh (~ mf) rising from 0:009 to 0:38 and ~ mf (~ mh) rising from 0 to
0:5. Thus, trade liberalization has a strong anti-competitive e⁄ect if the pre-merger capital shares of the
dominant ￿rm in the two countries di⁄er signi￿cantly from each other.
Result 6: As m0
h ! 0:5 and m0
f ! 0:5, at non-prohibitive tari⁄ levels, the e⁄ect of tari⁄ reduction is
negligible.
As m0
h ! 0:5 and m0
f ! 0:5, the "size e⁄ect" dominates. This ensures that the dominant ￿rm becomes
an international monopoly, regardless of the tari⁄ level, provided that the tari⁄ level is non-prohibitive.
This is illustrated in Tables 2 and 3, where starting at
￿
m0
h = 0:46; m0
f = 0:46
￿
the dominant ￿rm buys
all the fringe capital in both countries to reach (~ mh = 0:5; ~ mf = 0:5) regardless of whether t = 0:1 or
t = 0:
Table 4 summarizes the e⁄ect of tari⁄ reductions for di⁄erent combinations of pre-merger shares in the
25two countries.
Table 4: Optimal Capital Shares in response to Trade Liberalization
m0
h ! 0 m0
h ! 0:5
m0
f ! 0 t # ) ~ mh #; ~ mf #
Jump to free trade
) ~ mh "; ~ mf "
m0
f ! 0:5
Jump to free trade
) ~ mh "; ~ mf "
Negligible
Given this set of parameters, Results 1-6 hold qualitatively for all ￿ 2 [0;0:1): Scenario 2 discusses the
e⁄ect of raising ￿ above 0.1 in order to examine the scenario where all ￿rms in the industry attach a
greater weight to future pro￿ts than in Scenario 1.
Scenario 2: ￿ 2 [￿ ￿;1)
As discussed in the previous section, the dominant ￿rm has less incentive to undertake mergers (and more







, as ￿ is increased, the threshold values of m0
f and m0
h at which the merger wave occurs
becomes larger. This leads to Result 7.
Result 7: There exists ￿ ￿ 2 (0;1] such that at non-prohibitive tari⁄ levels, for ￿ > ￿ ￿; it holds that
mh ! 0 and mf ! 0 for all m0
h 2 [0;0:5] and m0
f 2 [0;0:5]:







the merger wave occurs tends to 0.5, so that at any given non-prohibitive tari⁄level there occur demerger
waves simultaneously in both countries. This is illustrated by Figures 2(a) and 2(b) for ￿ = 0:1. The
demerger patterns are very similar for all ￿ 2 [0:1;1):
Figure 2(a): Effect of trade liberalization on m f for
































































Figure 2(b): Effect of trade liberalization on m f for
































































26For a single closed economy, Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004) show that the dominant ￿rm has less
incentive to undertake mergers (and more incentive to undertake demergers) when ￿rms are more forward-
looking, as in the two-country model. However, in contrast to my results for non-prohibitive tari⁄s, in
the single closed economy case, the dominant ￿rm￿ s post-merger capital share remains strictly positive for
strictly positive pre-merger capital shares as ￿ is increased. In this two-country framework, as illustrated
by Figures 2(a) and 2(b), the dominant ￿rm￿ s post-merger capital shares in both countries tend to zero
regardless of the pre-merger capital shares for all ￿ 2 [0:1;1):
The higher the value of ￿; the more likely that the dominant ￿rm will sell capital. For all ￿ 2 [0:1;1) and
mf (mh) > 0; the price of the consumption good in Home (Foreign) is monotonically decreasing in mf
(mh). Thus, the value per unit of capital of the Home (Foreign) fringe ￿rms is monotonically decreasing
in mf (mh) for all mf (mh) > 0. As the dominant ￿rm sells capital in one country, it increases the
price of capital in the other country. This causes the dominant ￿rm to sell capital in the other country.
Subsequent to the initial sale of capital by the dominant ￿rm in either country, there, thus, occurs a wave
of demergers simultaneously in both countries, driven by the "cross-border e⁄ect".
It is noted that ￿ ￿; as de￿ned in Result 7, is decreasing in the elasticity of demand, ". This holds for all
" 2 (1:5;1000): For instance, as " falls from 4 to 3, ￿ ￿ rises from 0.1 to 0.35.22 Thus, in this model, the
incentive to merge is increased as the elasticity of demand is reduced. This is in contrast to the result
obtained by Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004) for the single closed economy case. In their model, the
post-merger price of the consumption good is increasing in the elasticity of demand. Thus, the post-
merger quantity produced by the non-participating fringe ￿rms is decreasing in the elasticity of demand.
This factor induces the dominant ￿rm to buy less capital from the fringe at lower elasticity of demand.
On the other hand, in this two-country framework, a merger in Home leads to greater exports to Foreign.
The lower the elasticity of demand, the greater the volume of merger-induced exports. Assuming identical
" across countries, a lower elasticity of demand increases the post-merger pro￿ts from sales in Foreign
at the expense of sales in Home. Given these parameter values, the former e⁄ect outweighs the latter,
explaining why ￿ ￿ is decreasing in ":
It is also noted that ￿ ￿ is increasing in the elasticity of supply, ￿: For instance, to acheive the same increase
in ￿ ￿ as above (from 0.1 to 0.35), ￿ must fall from 1 to 0.5.
Finally, I note that ￿ ￿ is decreasing in the parameter characterizing the ￿xed proportions technology, ￿:
In order to acheive the same increase in ￿ ￿ as above (from 0.1 to 0.35), ￿ must fall from 0.8 to 0.7. These
￿ndings are similar to those of Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004) for the single closed economy case.
Scenario 3: Forward-looking dominant ￿rm and myopic fringe
So far I have assumed that all ￿rms within the industry are equally forward-looking with a common
22In this paper, I restrict my attention to values of " strictly greater than 1. This is because, given inelastic demand
functions, the value of fringe ￿rms in the neighbourhood of an international monopoly approach in￿nity.
27discount factor, ￿: In Scenario 3, this assumption is relaxed. In reality, a dominant ￿rm often has deeper
pockets than its followers and, being the market leader, has more information about its own future
strategies than do the followers. In such cases, due to the di⁄erential of availability of information and/or
credit across ￿rms, the dominant ￿rm might be in a position to attach a greater weight to its future
pro￿ts than do the competitive fringe ￿rms. Therefore, I examine the scenario where the dominant ￿rm
is more forward-looking than the fringe ￿rms. The discount factor of the dominant ￿rm is given by ￿d
and that of the fringe ￿rms is given by ￿f:
Figure 3(a): Effect of trade liberalization on m f for
































































Figure 3(b): Effect of trade liberalization on m h for
































































Result 8: There exists ￿ m0
f 2 (0; 1
2); such that for m0
f < ￿ m0
f tari⁄ reduction from a prohibitive to a
non-prohibitive level causes merger patterns across the two countries to diverge.
As long as all ￿rms have the same discount factor, a tari⁄reduction from a prohibitive to a non-prohibitive
level aligns merger patterns across both countries, as pointed out by Result 2. This result does not hold
when ￿rms di⁄er in the degree to which they are forward-looking. Result 8 shows that when the pre-
merger capital share is su¢ ciently small in any one country, a move from a prohibitive to a non-prohibitive
tari⁄ fails to align merger patterns across Home and Foreign. This is illustrated by Figures 3(a) and 3(b)
for m0
f < ￿ m0
f = 0:2.
Recall that, when all ￿rms are equally forward-looking, the main source of discrepancy between the
merger decisions taken by a myopic and forward looking industry is the behaviour of the fringe ￿rms.
This would suggest that Scenario 3 (where the fringe ￿rms are myopic) should be similar to Scenario 1
(where all ￿rms are myopic). This explains why Figure 3(b) closely resembles Figure 1(b). The merger
decisions in Foreign, however, do not match in Scenarios 1 and 3, as illustrated by Figures 3(a) and 1(a).
The demergers that occur in Home for m0
f < ￿ m0
f = 0:2 cause exports to fall. This increases the value of
the Foreign fringe ￿rms. The increase in the value of each unit of capital is higher to the dominant ￿rm
than to the fringe ￿rms, since the latter are myopic. Thus, the minimum price that fringe ￿rms require to
agree to sell their capital is lower than what the dominant ￿rm is willing to pay for each unit of capital.
For this reason, the bene￿t from buying each unit of capital is greater than the cost to the dominant
￿rm. This results in mergers in Foreign for m0
f < ￿ m0
f = 0:2:
It is noted that ￿ m0




. This holds for all ￿d 2 (0:01;1); given ￿f = 0:01: For
28instance, for an increase in ￿d from 0.1 to 0.3, ￿ m0
f falls from 0.2 to 0.16. On the other hand, for a decrease
in ￿d from 0.1 to 0.05, ￿ m0
f rises from 0.2 to 0.22. Also, ￿ m0
f is decreasing in ": For a decrease in " from 0.4
to 0.3, for instance, ￿ m0
f rises from 0.2 to 0.26. On the other hand, for an increase in " from 0.4 to 0.5,
￿ m0
f falls from 0.2 to 0.14. Also, ￿ m0
f is decreasing in ￿; the elasticity of supply: For a decrease in ￿ from
1 to 0.5, for instance, ￿ m0
f rises from 0.2 to 0.5. For an increase in ￿ from 1 to 1.5, ￿ m0
f falls from 0.2 to
0.12. According to the simulations, ￿ m0
f is decreasing in ￿: For a decrease in ￿ from 0.8 to 0.7, ￿ m0
f rises
from 0.2 to 0.24. For an increase in ￿ from 0.8 to 0.9, ￿ m0
f falls from 0.2 to 0.14.
5 Conclusion
A dynamic dominant-￿rm model with an endogenous merger process, constant returns to scale production
and a two-country framework was used to examine the e⁄ects of trade liberalization on industry structure.
The factors driving the results, given this setting, were as follows. Merging allows the merger participants
to gain by raising prices. The free rider e⁄ect hinders the realization of mergers. The dominant ￿rm
and the fringes have di⁄erent incentives to invest in the industry-speci￿c capital stock. By buying (or
selling) capital in any one of the countries, the dominant ￿rm can manipulate the price of capital in both
countries.
Moreover, the impact that trade liberalization has on merger activity depends crucially on the extent to
which ￿rms within the industry in question are forward-looking. It is well understood that economies
of scale and barriers to entry must be absent for an industry to tend toward a competitive structure.
This paper showed that another important factor a⁄ecting industry structure is the discount factor. For
an industry spread across several countries, it was shown that a competitive structure is more likely to
evolve internationally the more forward-looking the ￿rms. This is because forward-looking fringe ￿rms
expect the dominant ￿rm to cut production subsequent to a merger. Also, a merger raises the price of
capital and signals that the dominant ￿rm might continue to buy capital from the fringe in the future.
This encourages the fringe ￿rms to invest at a higher rate. Capital sell-o⁄s prove to be a substitute for
commitment to the dominant ￿rm. To discourage the fringe from investing, the dominant ￿rm uses the
sale of capital as a signal to indicate that it will not raise the price of the consumption good or buy
capital in the future. Once the dominant ￿rm starts selling capital in one country, it is possible that
it raises the price of capital in the other, thus making it pro￿table to start selling capital in the other
country simultaneously. Such behavior causes the merger decisions of ￿rms at high discount factors to
induce a competitive structure, provided that the tari⁄ level is non-prohibitive, so that the e⁄ect of trade
liberalization turns out to be negligible.
At lower values of the discount factor, however, the impact of trade liberalization on industry structure
was shown to be signi￿cant and dependent on the pre-merger capital shares of the dominant ￿rm in both
countries. Of particular concern to antitrust authorities are scenarios with very low discount factors where
29a jump to free trade pushes the industry to an international monopoly. This was shown to be possible if
the pre-merger capital share is su¢ ciently high in any one of the countries. When the pre-merger capital
share is strictly positive but signi￿cantly lower than its maximum possible value in one country and close
to its maximum in the other, the anti-competitive e⁄ect of trade liberalization is strongest. The dominant
￿rm signi￿cantly increases its capital shares in both countries in the face of trade liberalization, even if
the new tari⁄ level remains strictly positive. On the other hand, when the pre-merger capital shares in
both countries is close to zero, tari⁄ reductions have a pro-competitive e⁄ect, that is, post-merger capital
shares become lower as the tari⁄level falls. However, this e⁄ect is negligibly small unless the tari⁄jumps
from a prohibitive to a non-prohibitive level. Even when it is signi￿cant, this e⁄ect only occurs for a
small range of pre-merger capital shares very close to zero.
This study was not restricted to non-prohibitive tari⁄ levels. A natural question that arises is the
following: What happens when the tari⁄ reduction is from a prohibitive to a non-prohibitive level? At
prohibitive tari⁄ levels, the dominant ￿rm buys capital in one country whilst selling in the other. This
can lead to changes in the welfare of the two countries in opposite directions. Thus, it might be desirable
to create supra-national antitrust authorities to ensure that changes in industry structure are Pareto
improving for both countries. It was shown that trade liberalization, in such situations, has the e⁄ect of
aligning the merger patterns across both countries, provided that all ￿rms are equally forward-looking.
Thus, trade liberalization reduces the need for supra-national intervention. This result may, however, be
reversed when the dominant ￿rm is more forward-looking than the fringe ￿rms.
The main conclusion from this study is the following. To accurately forecast merger behaviour and
formulate international competition policy in the face of trade liberalization, it is essential to take into
consideration the existing industry structure and the discount factors of individual ￿rms.
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Appendix
I. Proof of Lemma 1
P roof.
With a single period, the ￿rst order condition of the Home fringe ￿rms￿problem (6) in the output/investment
30stage in the Home market is reduced to
P(Q) ￿ c0(q + q￿) = 0 (26)
i.e. price equals marginal cost. The ￿rst order condition of the dominant ￿rms￿problem (9) in the
output/investment stage in the Home market is given by:
mhP(Q) + (mhqd + mfx)P0(Q)
@Q
@qd
￿ mhc0(qd + q￿
d) = 0
Equivalently,
MRd ￿ c0(qd + q￿
d) = 0
where
MRd ￿ P(Q) +
1
mh
(mhqd + mfx) (27)
P0(Q)
￿
















A dominant ￿rm with either 0 < mh < 1 or 0 < mf < 1 or both, has MRd < p, and hence qd < q: The
method for showing x < y; q￿
d < q￿ and x￿ < y￿; as stated in Lemma 1, is very similar to that presented
above.
To interpret Lemma 1, consider the expression for MRd; where MRd denotes the increase in revenue to
the dominant ￿rm from selling an additional unit of qd:














When the dominant ￿rm increases its sales in Home, qd; by one unit, it gets price, P(Q); for the extra unit
sold. But the extra supply lowers the price on the (mhqd + mfx) units it was already selling. If the ￿rm





@qd) in (28) would be unity and the change in price would be 1
mh(mhqd +mfx)P0(Q):
This is the direct e⁄ect of supplying one more unit in the Home market. If there does exist a competitive
fringe in either country then any increase in the dominant ￿rm￿ s supply is mitigated by the fringe ￿rms￿
supply. This is the strategic part of the e⁄ect and is of the opposite sign to the direct e⁄ect. Thus (mh











dmh (mh (vd + v￿
d) + mf (vx + v￿
x)) > vh + v￿
h
for either mh > 0; mf > 0; or both
23Recall that
￿








@qd: Assume contradictorily that
￿






is non-positive. This implies that as the dominant ￿rm increases output,
total output in the Home market does not increase. Thus price does not fall. Therefore, the fringe ￿rms do not contract
their outputs. However, together with the fact that the dominant ￿rm is increasing output this implies that total output is






dmf (mh (vd + v￿
d) + mf (vx + v￿
x)) > vf + v￿
f
for either mh > 0; mf > 0; or both
P roof.
(i) Consider the fringe policy functions, ~ q (qd;x;mh;mf;K;Kf), implicitly de￿ned by (26). Expanding








￿P0 (qd ￿ q)(1 ￿ mh ￿ mf) + c"(q￿ ￿ q ￿ q￿
d + qd)








￿mh (P0(1 ￿ mh ￿ mf) ￿ c")









d ￿ q￿)(1 ￿ mh ￿ mf) + c"(￿q￿ + q + q￿
d ￿ qd)











(1 ￿ mh ￿ mf)(P0(1 ￿ mh ￿ mf) ￿ 2c")
For the single period case, the dominant ￿rm value of Home production is
vd + v￿
d = P(Q)qd + P(Y )q￿
d ￿ c(qd + q￿
d) ￿ tq￿
d
evaluated at the optimal qd;q￿


























= P0(qd + q￿
d)
￿
(q ￿ qd + q￿ ￿ q￿
d)c"
P0 (1 ￿ mh ￿ mf) ￿ 2c"
￿
32Rearranging terms and substituting for MRd and MR￿




d) + mf(vx + v￿
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= pqd + p￿q￿












h ￿ pq ￿ p￿q￿ + tq￿ + c(q + q￿)
= vh + v￿
h
+p(qd ￿ q) + p￿ (q￿
d ￿ q￿) ￿ (c(qd + q￿





d) + mf(x + x￿))
￿
(q ￿ qd + q￿ ￿ q￿
d)c"
P0 (1 ￿ mh ￿ mf) ￿ 2c"
￿￿




d ￿ c(qd + q￿
d) ￿ tq￿
d] ￿ [MRdq + MR￿
dq￿ ￿ c(q + q￿) ￿ tq￿]
The last two terms in the last line sum to a strictly positive number, since z = qd and z￿ = q￿
d are the
unique maximizers of [MRdz + MR￿
dz￿ ￿ c(z + z￿) ￿ tz￿]; and q 6= qd; q￿ 6= q￿
d for either mh > 0;mf > 0;








> vh(mh;mf;Kf) + v￿
h(mh;mf;Kf) (31)
(ii) Similar to proof of (i).
III. Proof of Proposition 2
P roof.
It holds that ~ mh(m0
h;m0
f;K;Kf) < m0
h and ~ mf(m0
h;m0
f;K;Kf) < m0
f i⁄(11) and (12) are both negative.

































< 0; it is straightforward to show the following. Given Case D,
(32) and (33) are satis￿ed i⁄ (13) holds. It is also straightforward to show that (32) and (33) cannot be
satis￿ed given Cases A-C.
IV. Proof of Proposition 3
P roof.
It holds that ~ mh(m0
h;m0
f;K;Kf) > m0
h and ~ mf(m0
h;m0
f;K;Kf) > m0
f i⁄ (11) and (12) are both positive.

































> 0; it is straightforward to show the following. Given Case A,
(34) and (35) are satis￿ed i⁄ (14) and (15) hold. This proves Proposition 3 (i). Given Case B, (34) and
(35) are satis￿ed i⁄ (16) and (17) hold. This proves Proposition 3 (ii). Given Case C, (34) and (35) are
satis￿ed i⁄ (18) and (19) hold. This proves Proposition 3 (iii). Given Case D, (34) and (35) are satis￿ed
i⁄ (20) holds. This proves Proposition 3 (iv).
V. Proof of Proposition 4
P roof.
It holds that ~ mh(m0
h;m0
f;K;Kf) > m0
h and ~ mf(m0
h;m0
f;K;Kf) < m0
f i⁄ (11) is positive and (12) is
negative. Thus, for the dominant ￿rm to be buying in Home and selling in Foreign, the following two

































< 0; it is straightforward to show the following. Given Case A,
(36) and (37) are satis￿ed i⁄ (21) and (22) hold. This proves Proposition 4 (i). Given Case B, (36) and
(37) are satis￿ed i⁄ (14) and (23) hold. This proves Proposition 4 (ii). Given Case C, (36) and (37) are
satis￿ed i⁄ (20) holds. This proves Proposition 4 (iii). Given Case D, (36) and (37) are satis￿ed i⁄ (24)
and (25) hold. This proves Proposition 4 (iv).
VI. Details of computational algorithm
In Section 4, to simulate the model, the ￿nite grid approximation method is used.24 To compute the
equilibrium reached in a given period, I ￿x K and Kf: I discretize the state space (mh;mf) into a ￿nite
rectangular grid and iterate on the fringe and dominant ￿rm value and policy functions until reaching
a ￿xed point. I use a 50x50 grid for the state space and evaluate all state variables over the ranges
m0
h 2 [0;0:5] and m0
f 2 [0;0:5]:
Using the ￿nite grid approximation, the value functions are not smooth. This leads to convergence
problems. To overcome this, I add a tiny logistic smoothing error to the payo⁄s at each grid point.
The policy and value functions are then evaluated by setting the payo⁄s to the ones yielded by the
model plus the smoothing error. The larger the grid, the smaller the error required to make the value
functions smooth upto computer precision. The smoothing error I impose is smaller than 10￿3 times the
standard logistic error. I verify using even smaller errors that the impact of this error on the equilibrium
is negligible. With the smoothing error, the merger and investment decisions e⁄ectively become weighted
averages of the values at grid points near the true optimum, where the weights are larger the closer the
value at the grid point to the true optimum. The weights are computed using the standard multinomial
logit formulas. A randomly selected sample of the simulations have also been run using a 200x200 grid
to check that the results do not change signi￿cantly when using a ￿ner grid. Further details are available
upon request.
24We essentially adopt the method used by Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004) and modify it to suit the open economy
model.
34VII. List of key variables
p : Equilibrium market price of consumption good in Home
p￿ : Equilibrium market price of consumption good in Foreign
Q : Total sales of consumption good, including imports, in the Home market
Y : Total sales of consumption good, including imports, in the Foreign market
t : Tari⁄ level
K : Industry-speci￿c capital
Kh : Units of capital owned by Home fringe ￿rms jointly
Kf : Units of capital owned by Foreign fringe ￿rms jointly
Kh
d : Units of capital owned by the dominant ￿rm and located in Home
K
f
d : Units of capital owned by the dominant ￿rm and located in Foreign
L : Non-industry-speci￿c labor
F(K;L) : Production technology
￿ : Units of capital produced per unit of consumption good produced
c(:) : Labor cost per unit of capital
mh : Proportion of the total industry capital stock held by the dominant ￿rm in Home post-merger
mf : Proportion of the total industry capital stock held by the dominant ￿rm in Foreign post-merger
m0
h : Proportion of the total industry capital stock held by the dominant ￿rm in Home pre-merger
m0
f : Proportion of the total industry capital stock held by the dominant ￿rm in Foreign pre-merger
vh : Discounted value to a Home fringe ￿rm per unit of capital from Home pro￿ts
v￿
h : Discounted value to a Home fringe ￿rm per unit of capital from Foreign pro￿ts
vf : Discounted value to a Foreign fringe ￿rm per unit of capital from Home pro￿ts
v￿
f : Discounted value to a Foreign fringe ￿rm per unit of capital from Foreign pro￿ts
vd : Discounted value to the dominant ￿rm from Home pro￿ts per unit of capital located in Home
v￿
d : Discounted value to the dominant ￿rm from Foreign pro￿ts per unit of capital located in Home
vx : Discounted value to the dominant ￿rm from Home pro￿ts per unit of capital located in Foreign
v￿
x : Discounted value to the dominant ￿rm from Foreign pro￿ts per unit of capital located in Foreign
wd : Total discounted value to the dominant ￿rm from Home pro￿ts earned by capital located in Home
w￿
d : Total discounted value to the dominant ￿rm from Foreign pro￿ts earned by capital located in Home
wx : Total discounted value to the dominant ￿rm from Home pro￿ts earned by capital located in Foreign
w￿
x : Total discounted value to the dominant ￿rm from Foreign pro￿ts earned by capital located in Foreign
qd : Sales in Home of the dominant ￿rm per unit of capital located in Home
q￿
d : Sales in Foreign of the dominant ￿rm per unit of capital located in Home
x : Sales in Home of the dominant ￿rm per unit of capital located in Foreign
x￿ : Sales in Foreign of the dominant ￿rm per unit of capital located in Foreign
q : Sales per unit of capital in Home of the Home fringe ￿rms
q￿ : Sales per unit of capital in Foreign of the Home fringe ￿rms
y : Sales per unit of capital in Home of the Foreign fringe ￿rms
y￿ : Sales per unit of capital in Foreign of the Foreign fringe ￿rms
￿ : Discount factor
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